Louisiana Law Review
Volume 77
Number 3 Louisiana Law Review - Spring 2017

Article 11

3-8-2017

Unveiling Management’s Crystal Ball
Eric R. Harper

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Repository Citation
Eric R. Harper, Unveiling Management’s Crystal Ball, 77 La. L. Rev. (2017)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol77/iss3/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Unveiling Management’s Crystal Ball
INTRODUCTION
Have you ever wanted to look into a crystal ball and predict the future?
Although not always accurate, most companies have the ability to look
into their “crystal ball” and make predictions for the future of the business.
Companies may disclose this forward-looking information to shareholders
or potential investors, but may also choose not to unveil the crystal ball,
considering that the predictions could have a negative impact on their
current stock prices. If a company’s investors suspect a company’s
statements were materially false or misleading, the investors may bring a
securities fraud class action lawsuit, claiming the company omitted certain
material forward-looking information that likely would have had a
negative impact on revenues and profits.1
Item 303 under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (“Securities
Act”), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange
Act”), and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, as amended
(collectively “Item 303”) requires that reporting companies disclose
information about the companies’ plans and outlooks for the future of their
businesses.2 The Second and Ninth Circuits—the two United States circuit
courts hearing the most securities fraud cases—have interpreted the
jurisprudence differently and thus are divided on the legal consequences of
management’s failure to provide adequate forward-looking information.3
The two interpretations come from a Third Circuit opinion about whether a
material omission of Item 303 forward-looking information could be the
foundation of a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud claim.4 The Third Circuit
reasoned that a violation of Item 303’s reporting requirements5—the most
Copyright 2017, by ERIC R. HARPER.
1. See Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2016).
2. See id.
3. John Stigi & Madalyn Macarr, Second Circuit Notes Split with Ninth Circuit
Over Whether Failure to Make Adequate Disclosures Under Item 303 of Regulation
S-K May Serve as Basis for Section 10(b) Claim, SHEPPARDMULLIN: CORP. & SEC.
L. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2015/01
/second-circuit-notes-split-with-ninth-circuit-over-whether-failure-to-make-adequate
-disclosures-under-item-303-of-regulation-s-k-may-serve-as-basis-for-a-section-10bclaim/ [https://perma.cc/K88R-DGPK].
4. Compare In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054–55 (9th
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015), with Stratte-McClure v. Morgan
Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2015).
5. For a detailed explanation of Item 303’s reporting requirements see infra
Part I.E.
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significant public disclosures focusing on current operations and
management’s plans for the future6—“does not automatically give rise to a
material omission under Rule 10b-5” and result in related liability,7 but the
circuits have not universally accepted this reasoning.8
Some circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, assert that Item 303 does not
create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) under the Exchange
Act (“Section 10(b)”) and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated under Section
10(b) (“Rule 10b-5”).9 However, other circuits, such as the Second Circuit,
hold that a Section 10(b) claim arises when a company fails to make
required Item 303 disclosures and the “materiality” requirements as set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson are
satisfied.10 While the United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to
resolve this conflict in 2015, it refused to grant a writ of certiorari on this
issue.11
To eliminate cross-circuit disparity and provide clarity regarding
whether omitted Item 303 information is subject to a claim under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the United States Supreme Court should review the
Ninth and Second Circuits’ conflicting analyses when given the
opportunity. Further, the Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s
conclusion and hold that failure to make a mandatory Item 303 disclosure
is a material omission that can serve as the foundation for a securities fraud
claim under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, because Item 303 creates a duty
to disclose material information.12 This unifying effort helps achieve the

6. 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 9.4[7][C], at 30 (4th ed. 2002).
7. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000). See also 17 C.F.R. §
229.303.
8. Compare NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056 (“[I]tem 303 does
not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”), with
Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100 (“[A] failure to make a required Item 303
disclosure . . . is indeed an omission that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b)
securities fraud claim.”).
9. See, e.g., NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056.
10. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
11. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 135 S.
Ct. 2349 (2015) (No. 14-975) (declining to resolve “[w]hether Item 303 of
Regulation S-K forms the basis for a duty to disclose otherwise material
information for purposes of an omission actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 as the Second Circuit recently held in direct
conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case”).
12. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101.
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purpose of the Exchange Act.13 Additionally, the circuits’ agreement on
the application of Item 303 in a 10b-5 class action lawsuit provides clear
guidance to the investors and helps to promote integrity in the capital
markets.14
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I provides background
information concerning the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, including the
Court’s interpretation of materiality in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,15 and Item
303.16 Part II explains the evolution of the approach adopted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regarding the disclosure of
forward-looking information.17 This Part focuses primarily on the SEC’s
1989 interpretative release, which illustrated the SEC’s modern approach
to Item 303 disclosures, demonstrating that the modern approach should
not be used as a rationale for preventing private securities fraud causes of
action.18 Part III describes the differences between a private cause of action
for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 and the cease-and-desist powers of
the SEC, including the benefits of both, demonstrating that the SEC’s
powers are an ineffective deterrent to securities fraud.19 Part IV describes
the various approaches courts have taken to Item 303, focusing on three
recent holdings from the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits.20 Finally, Part
V proposes that the Supreme Court adopt the findings in Stratte-McClure
v. Morgan Stanley21—making a party liable for federal securities fraud
13. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the purpose
of the Exchange Act is to implement a “philosophy of full disclosure.” Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977)).
14. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of
Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1169 (2003) (“Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were designed to protect investors and promote the integrity
of our securities markets by preventing fraud, manipulation, and deception in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”).
15. The United States Supreme Court also analyzed the reliance factor of a
10b-5 class action lawsuit, proclaiming a presumption of reliance, but only the
materiality analysis is relevant to this Comment. See Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
16. See infra Part I.A–E.
17. See infra Part II.A–B.
18. See infra Part II.A–B.
19. See infra Part III.A–B.
20. See infra Part IV.A–C.
21. The Second Circuit interpreted Item 303 as creating a disclosure duty.
Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015). Accordingly, if a class of
investors satisfies the Basic materiality standard, as well as the additional 10b-5
elements, then the class could recover damages for fraudulent material omissions
by a company. See id. at 100.
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under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 due to a material omission of Item
303 forward-looking information.22
I. PEEKING INTO MANAGEMENT’S CRYSTAL BALL
Rooted in the Exchange Act,23 and, more specifically, promulgated by
the SEC under Section 10(b),24 Rule 10b-525 is designed to protect private
investors and deter issuers of securities from engaging in fraudulent
conduct.26 Until 1980, when Regulation S-K was enacted, there were no
means to satisfy the Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements in an
integrated manner.27 Regulation S-K is a securities regulatory scheme that
was designed to satisfy the filing requirements under the Securities Act28
and the Exchange Act.29 Particularly, Item 303 mandates that a company
must file certain information with the SEC, including known trends and
uncertainties relating to liquidity, capital resources, and results of
operations.30 Although the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed a
basic rule for materiality,31 the lower courts are split as to its application
to a securities fraud lawsuit relating to a material omission of forwardlooking information.32

22. See infra Part V.
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2012).
24. Id. § 78j.
25. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2016).
26. See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The
basic intent of . . . [R]ule 10b-5 . . . is to protect investors and instill confidence
in the securities markets by penalizing unfair dealings.”).
27. See Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules,
Regulations, and Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems,
Exchange Act Release No. 33–6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 2, 1980) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
28. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa.
29. See Exchange Act Release No. 33–6231, supra note 27. Regulation S-K
is a broad array of instructions to provide guidance to issuers as to the information
they must provide in all documents filed with the SEC. This includes, but is not
limited to, instructions for filing registration statements and periodic disclosure
reports.
30. Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
31. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238–39 (1988).
32. Compare NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015), with Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley,
776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015).
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A. Congressional Creation of the Securities Exchange Act
Congress enacted landmark securities legislation in 1933 and 1934—
the Securities Act33 and the Exchange Act,34 respectively (collectively “the
Acts”). The purpose of the Acts was to protect investors by promoting
transparency in the marketplace.35 Similar to the Securities Act’s mandate
that issuers register their securities for the benefit of persons purchasing
securities in primary markets, the policy underlying the Exchange Act
requires the registration of securities to protect those investors purchasing
in secondary markets.36 In addition to Congress’s explicit policy
pronouncement for the Exchange Act, several other rationales underlie the
enactment of the Exchange Act. A long line of cases support the assertions
that “[m]anipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive
upon mystery and secrecy”37 and that the core purpose of the Exchange
Act is to implement full disclosure.38 The Supreme Court has also stated
that the Exchange Act was promulgated to address investors’ fear of being
injured by manipulated stock prices.39 One commentator has proclaimed
that the purpose of the Exchange Act was to reform the markets to control
speculation, prevent insider trading, and eliminate other forms of market
manipulation.40 Section 10(b) is an essential provision to prevent market
manipulation.41
B. Section 10(b) Bars the Use of Manipulative or Deceptive Devices
Section 10(b) prohibits a person from employing or exercising “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa.
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn.
35. Alison B. Miller, Comment, Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma:
Corporate Illegality and the Federal Securities Laws, 102 GEO L.J. 1647, 1652
(2014).
36. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa; see also id. § 78b. For more
information on the similar policies underlying the Acts, see CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR.
ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS § 1.02–1.03 (5th ed. 2015).
37. Basic Inc. v. Levison, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
73-1383 (1934)).
38. See, e.g., id. at 230 (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 477–78, (1977) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963))).
39. Id. at 230 (citing S.Rep. No. 73-792 (1934)).
40. Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46
YALE L.J. 624, 629 (1937).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
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rules and regulations as the Commission [SEC] may prescribe.”42 Section
10(b) was designed by Congress as a “catchall clause” to enable the SEC
to deal with the evolving array of manipulative devices.43 The Court argues
that the legislative history of the Exchange Act fails to provide the
intended scope of Section 10(b).44 The applicability of Section 10(b) to
certain private securities fraud causes of action remains unanswered.
C. The SEC Promulgates Rule 10b-5 to Create Liability for Materially
Misleading Statements or Omissions
In 1942, the SEC wielded its authority under Section 10(b) and
promulgated Rule 10b-5.45 This rule makes it impermissible for any person
engaged in the sale of securities “[t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.”46 Moreover, the rule provides two additional restrictions.47
A person must not engage in fraudulent acts by use of “any device,
scheme, or artifice,” nor “engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . .
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”48 Rule 10b-5 has
generally been viewed as a “fraud-based” remedy due to its scienter
requirement.49
To recover damages in a private federal securities fraud action under
Rule 10b-5, a party must satisfy the requirements implied by Section 10(b)
as enumerated by the Supreme Court.50 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
promulgated under the Exchange Act require a plaintiff to prove the
following: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant;
(2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission
and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”51
42. Id.
43. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
44. Id. at 202.
45. Id. at 195–96.
46. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2016).
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, § 5.02[C].
50. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008).
51. Id.
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There is no express indication by Congress or the SEC that Section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5 provides a private civil remedy for violating said
provisions.52 But it is now generally accepted that Rule 10b-5 establishes an
implied private remedy that is applicable to all purchases and sales of
securities.53
D. A Uniform Standard of Materiality for a 10b-5 Action
The United States Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc.54 was confronted with what the standard for “materiality” is in the
context of proxy statements.55 The Court noted that the question of
materiality was objective and involved “the significance of an omitted or
misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.”56 Announcing the “total
mix” standard, the Court held that omitted facts are material when there is
a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
‘total mix’ of information made available.”57
More than a decade later, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Court again
faced questions regarding the standard of materiality.58 When asked to
determine the proper standard of materiality for a 10b-5 securities fraud
action in the context of preliminary corporate merger talks,59 the Court
adopted the TSC Industries materiality standard for Rule 10b-5 actions.60
However, the Court noted that the TSC Industries standard may only be
effective in this context for certain and clear information.61 It was
necessary that a new standard be created because the TSC Industries

52. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
53. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that there is an
implied cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (first citing
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971), and
then citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150 (1972)).
See also JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, §5.01[C].
54. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
55. Id. at 448–49. A proxy statement is “[a]n informational document that
accompanies a proxy solicitation and explains a proposed action (such as a merger)
by the corporation.” Proxy Statement, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
56. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 445.
57. Id. at 449.
58. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226 (1988).
59. Id. at 226–27.
60. Id. at 232.
61. Id. See also id. at 232 n.9.
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standard made it difficult to determine if a “reasonable investor” would
consider omissions of speculative information significant.62
Thus, the Court announced a balancing test to determine the
materiality of speculative or forward-looking information in the 10b-5
context.63 A court must balance “the indicated probability that the event
will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality
of the company activity.”64 To determine the probability of the event
occurring, “a factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest in the
transaction at the highest corporate levels” and “consider such facts as the
size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums over
market value” to determine the magnitude of the transaction.65
In a footnote, the Court noted that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose,
is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”66 This statement has resonated
throughout the courts and has proved to be extremely significant in the
context of liability for forward-looking material omissions. A plain
reading of Rule 10b-5 leads a reader to conclude that only existing facts,
which are misleading and material, are actionable, but the Court
effectively expanded the scope of Rule 10b-5 in Basic by recognizing that
speculative, forward-looking information may be actionable under 10b-5
if it satisfies the balancing test for the materiality of speculative
information.67 Safe harbor provisions now protect issuers from liability
when they disclose material forward-looking information with the SEC.68
E. Item 303 Mandates That a Company Must File Certain Material
Information with the SEC
Item 303—Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations (“MD&A”)—requires issuers to
disclose information, whether historical or forward-looking,69 necessary to

62. See id. at 232.
63. Id. at 238–40.
64. Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d
Cir. 1968)).
65. Id. at 239.
66. Id. at 239 n.17.
67. See Miller, supra note 35, at 1654. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016)
(“It shall be unlawful . . . “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . .
not misleading . . . .”) (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.175.
69. In one SEC safe harbor provision, forward-looking information includes
projections of financial information, a statement of management’s plans and
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permit “investors and other users to assess the financial condition and
results of operations of the registrant, with particular emphasis on the
registrant’s prospects for the future.”70 Item 303 falls within the broad
regulatory scheme of Regulation S-K,71 and more narrowly within the
subdivision for disclosures of financial information.72 MD&A’s principal
purpose is to provide investors with the material information necessary to
garner an understanding of a company’s current and future financial
standing.73
Item 303 requires that the issuer discuss its financial condition,
changes in financial condition, and results of operations, focusing on a
company’s liquidity, capital resources, results of operations, off-balance
sheet arrangements, and contractual obligations.74 Not only must the
required information be disclosed, but Item 303 includes a catchall
provision, requiring an issuer to “provide such other information” to
permit an investor to grasp an understanding of the issuer’s financial
condition, any changes to that financial condition, as well as the results of
the issuer’s operations.75
The issuer must disclose any “known trends” that are “reasonably
likely” to materially increase or decrease the company’s liquidity in any
way,76 describe its material commitments for capital expenditures, and
disclose any known material trends in the company’s capital resources.77
Moreover, Item 303 requires an issuer to provide all known trends the
issuer reasonably believes will materially alter net sales, revenues, or
income and will continue for the foreseeable future to affect its SEC
filings.78 In addition, Item 303 requires a company to disclose certain offbalance sheet arrangements79 and its contractual obligations.80
objectives for future operations, and a statement of future economic performance
contained in MD&A. See id.
70. Management’s Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition & Results
of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release
No. 6835, 43 SEC Docket 1330 (May 18, 1989).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10.
72. Id. § 229.300.
73. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition & Results of Operation, Securities Act Release No. 8350, 81
SEC Docket 2905 (Dec. 19, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 211, 231, 241).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 229.303 (a)(1).
77. Id. § 229.303(a)(2).
78. Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
79. Id. § 229.303(a)(4).
80. Id. § 229.303 (a)(5).
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Item 303’s instructions provide considerable guidance to registrants.
The instructions mention the applicability of safe harbor provisions.81 Item
303(c) provides that the statutory safe harbors provided in Section 27A of
the Securities Act82 and Section 21E of the Exchange Act83 shall apply to
forward-looking information disclosed, whether by an issuer or someone
directly associated with the issuer, under Item 303.84 In addition to the
statutory safe harbors, the SEC promulgated Rule 175—a safe harbor for
projections—to provide additional protection to a company disclosing
forward-looking information.85 Under this rule, forward-looking
information is immune from liability when supported by a reasonable basis
and made in good faith.86 These safe harbor provisions protect mandatory
forward-looking statements made pursuant to Item 303,87 but these
protections are inapposite when a company fails to disclose material
information in MD&A regarding a particular uncertainty or trend.88
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SEC’S VIEW ON
UNVEILING THE CRYSTAL BALL
MD&A has been described as one of the most challenging sections to
prepare in a prospectus or other SEC filings.89 As it relates to a Rule 10b-5
class action lawsuit, there is a lack of uniformity among the courts as to the
proper standard of materiality to be used in determining what disclosure is
required.90 Some courts say it is the standard set forth by the SEC; others argue
it is the standard set forth in Basic for speculative, forward-looking
information.91 This controversy has incidentally perplexed courts as to
whether Item 303 creates a duty to disclose for purposes of a private securities
fraud lawsuit.

81. Id. § 229.303 (c).
82. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z–2 (2012).
83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–5.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(c).
85. Id. § 230.175 (Rule 175).
86. Id.
87. See id. § 229.303(a); see also Brian Neach, Comment, Item 303’s Role in
Private Causes of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 741, 744–45 (2001).
88. Id.
89. JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, § 3.04[B].
90. See, e.g., In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir.
2014); but see Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015).
91. Id. See, e.g., In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1055; but see
Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100.
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A. Traditional MD&A Disclosure Requirements
MD&A in federal securities law dates back to 1968 when the SEC
adopted the Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements.92
Until that time, the SEC barred registrants from including projections in
prospectuses and reports filed with the SEC.93
In 1973, the SEC issued a statement that its position never was to
require disclosure of projections and that its position was not going to
change.94 The SEC intended to take steps toward incorporating projections
into the disclosure system, but it refused to determine if an issuer would be
required to disclose its projections.95 This statement marks the beginning of
the SEC’s transition in certain circumstances from prohibiting forwardlooking information to requiring its disclosure. An SEC commissioner
issued a statement proposing that the SEC would lift its prohibition on
disclosing forward-looking projections for issuers who satisfy standards that
would be determined at a later time.96 Those issuers who elected to file
projections would “be required to update those projections on a regular
basis, as well as in the event of material changes in the projections.”97 Once
a company started, it could not stop maintaining its forward-looking
information.
In 1975, the SEC proposed a set of rules and forms to establish a
sophisticated disclosure system for companies who sought to disclose
forward-looking information.98 Nearly one year later, the SEC decided to
withdraw all but one of the proposals in the face of mounting legal, policy,
and technical issues.99 However, this was not the end of the journey. After
the SEC’s Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure recommended
the SEC announce that companies should voluntarily disclose forward92. Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715
(Apr. 17, 1987).
93. Statement by the Commission on the Disclosure of Projections of Future
Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, 1 SEC Docket 11 (Feb. 2,
1973).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Rule and Form Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 5581, 6 SEC Docket
771 (Apr. 28, 1975); Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, 1978 WL 208169 (Nov. 7, 1978).
99. Notice of Adoption of Amendment to Rule 14a-9, Securities Act Release
No. 5699, 9 SEC Docket 472 (Apr. 23, 1976); Securities Act Release No. 5992,
supra note 98.
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looking information,100 the SEC issued a statement encouraging, but not
requiring, the disclosure of management projections.101
B. Modern MD&A Disclosure Requirements
The SEC entered MD&A’s modern era of disclosure in 1980 when it
adopted the present form of disclosure requirements.102 To improve
disclosure, reduce the burdens associated with disclosure, and facilitate
integrated disclosure under the Securities Acts, the SEC announced
amendments to Form 10-K103 and “to related forms, rules, regulations and
guides under the [Acts].”104 The final rule proposed an incorporated Form
10-K and the addition of Item 11 to Regulation S-K, which “would not
specifically require projections or other forward-looking information,
although the presentation of this type of information on a voluntary basis
would be encouraged.”105 In 1981, after conducting a review of disclosures
prepared in accordance with the newly adopted disclosure requirements,
the SEC provided practitioners with guidance for MD&A.106 The SEC
eventually adopted the integrated disclosure system and included Item

100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 205 (5th Cir.
1988).
102. While the Commission's indecisive history of standards for forwardlooking information may seem abstract, its progression can reasonably lead a
person to conclude that the Commission was approaching a conclusory position
in which there is a duty to disclose material forward-looking statements. See
Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and
Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 33–6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25, 1980) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 17 C.F.R.).
103. Form 10-K is an annual report issued pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Exchange Act.
104. Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations,
and Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630.
105. SEC Release Notice, Securities Act Release No. AS-279, 20 SEC Docket
1308 (Sept. 2, 1980).
106. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6349, 1981 WL 379268 (Sept.
28, 1981); see also Commission Guidance Regarding Management Discussion
and Analysis of Financial Condition & Results of Operation, Securities Act
Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec.
29, 2003).
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303, or Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operation, in the final rule.107
1. The SEC’s 1989 Interpretative Release Created the Current
Circuit Split
In 1987, the SEC sought public comment on MD&A standards and on
several proposed revisions.108 It noted that issuers are not required, but are
encouraged, to supply certain forward-looking information.109 In 1989, the
SEC issued a landmark interpretative release, which declared that Item 303
partially requires the disclosure of forward-looking information.110 For
example, the release stated, “MD&A requires discussions of ‘known
trends or any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that
will result in or that are reasonably likely to result in the registrant’s
liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way.’”111 MD&A’s
focus, illustrated in the Instructions to Item 303, is solely on known
material events and uncertainties “that would cause reported financial
information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or
of future financial condition.”112
The SEC emphasized the difference between required and optional
disclosures. A company is required to disclose forward-looking information
under Item 303 when it concludes that it is reasonably expected that known
trends, events, and uncertainties will have a material effect.113 The
information need not be disclosed when a company is merely “anticipating
a future trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known
event, trend or uncertainty.”114

107. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No.
6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 16, 1982) (codified in scattered sections of 17
C.F.R.).
108. Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange Act Release
No. 24356, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715 (Apr. 24, 1987).
109. Id.
110. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427 (May 24, 1989).
111. Id. at n.17.
112. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427 (May 24, 1989).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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To assist companies in determining whether the specific forward-looking
information in MD&A needs to be disclosed, the SEC created a two-prong
test.115 The two-prong assessment should be conducted when management
knows of trends, demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties.116 It
requires management to ask:
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty
likely to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not
reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure it required. (2) If
management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand,
commitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will
come to fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management
determines that a material effect on the registrant’s financial
condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to
occur.117
The SEC further noted that the Supreme Court’s probability–magnitude
test for materiality in Basic v. Levinson was inapposite for MD&A because
MD&A requires specific disclosure and declares its own standard for
disclosure.118 This indicates the SEC’s intention to make companies liable
in court for federal securities fraud because the company has a duty to
disclose material, forward-looking information. However, some courts
have held that this is not the case.119
2. The SEC Provides Issuers Additional Guidance Regarding Item
303 Disclosures
The SEC did not issue another interpretive release providing issuers
with additional guidance on how to respond to MD&A requirements until
2003.120 It described MD&A’s intent, namely to provide “readers with

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427 n.27 (May 18, 1989).
119. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427 (May 18, 1989).
120. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition & Results of Operation, Securities Act Release
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information ‘necessary to an understanding of [a company’s] financial
condition, changes in financial condition and results of operations,’” and
claimed that MD&A was not particularly complicated.121 This is striking
considering the numerous safe harbors available to issuers providing
forward-looking information under Item 303.122
The 2003 release reaffirmed that the purpose of MD&A is to allow an
investor or interested party to look at a company “through the eyes of those
who manage that business.”123 With regard to the focus and context of the
MD&A, the SEC proposed that companies should eliminate immaterial
information that does not relate to the issuer’s financial condition, liquidity
and capital resources, changes in financial condition, and results of
operations from its MD&A disclosures.”124 The SEC further stated that
MD&A aims to develop disclosure, which permits a contextual analysis
of financial information and allows investors to determine if past
performance is telling of future performance.125
III. THE SEC’S INSUFFICIENT REMEDIES CALL FOR
UNVEILING THE CRYSTAL BALL
A sufficient remedy must be available to investors when a company
abuses disclosure requirements. An investor must be able to adequately
recover if a company fails to comply with Item 303’s duty to disclose
forward-looking information. The securities regulatory domain has two
remedial bodies—the SEC and the courts. Each provides a distinct set of
remedies.126 Whether the SEC or the courts are the proper authority to

No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29,
2003).
121. JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, § 3.04[B] (quoting Commission
Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition & Results of Operation, Securities Act Release No. 8350, 68 Fed. Reg.
75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003)).
122. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z–2 (2012); see also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–5; 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2016).
123. Commission Guidance Regarding Management Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition & Results of Operation, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. The SEC may utilize its cease-and-desist powers to stop a company from
engaging in fraudulent conduct, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u–3, while the courts may
permit private parties to bring a class action lawsuit to remedy the injuries a
company may have inflicted on its investors due to fraudulent conduct, see, e.g.,
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
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remedy a material omission of forward-looking information is disputed.127
The courts are the superior alternative because investors are offered remedial
measures that the SEC has not brought to the table. Absent such a remedy,
unveiling management’s crystal ball, as it relates to recovering damages, is
completely irrelevant to investors.
A. The SEC’s Cease-and-Desist Power is an Insufficient Remedy to
Victims of Item 303 Securities Fraud
To prevent a business from engaging in fraudulent or manipulative
conduct, the SEC may grant a cease-and-desist order, directing a person to
halt illegal acts at the time of the order, as well as in the future.128 Section 8(A)
of the Securities Act,129 Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act,130 and other
federal statutes grant the SEC the power to issue a cease-and-desist order to
any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision
of federal securities laws.131 The Securities Enforcement Remedies Act
provides the SEC with the power to punish issuers improperly disclosing or
failing to disclose information through broad cease-and-desist authority.132
Upon finding that a business has violated or will violate a provision of
the Acts, the SEC may publish its findings and issue an order requiring the
business “to [cease and desist] from committing or causing such violation
and any future violation.”133 Moreover, the cease-and-desist order may
127. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014);
but see also Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015).
128. Dhaivat H. Shah, The Care and Feeding of an SEC Cease-and-Desist
Order: The Commission Defines Its Authority Through “in the Matter of KPMG
Peat Marwick, LLP,” 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 271, 272 (2002).
129. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1.
130. Id. § 78u-3.
131. See id. §§ 77h-1(a), 78u–3(a); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1, 80b-9 (2012); see also Andrew M. Smith, SEC Cease-and-Desist
Orders, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1999) (“The Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) [S]ection 8A(a), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) [S]ection 21C(a), the Investment Company Act [S]ection 9(f), and the
Investment Advisers Act [S]ection 203(k) provide that the SEC may impose a
cease-and-desist order upon any person who ‘is violating, has violated, or is about
to violate any provision’ of the federal securities laws. This plain language—‘has
violated’—appears to authorize the SEC to base a cease-and-desist order upon a
single past violation, without any showing that the violator is likely to break the
law in the future.”).
132. Suzanne J. Romajas, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A
Look at the Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S245, S286 (1993).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–3(a).
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require the business to comply with the provision that was violated,134
require accounting and disgorgement,135 and prohibit any person violating
any rules or regulations established by the SEC from serving as an officer
or director of any issuer that has a class of registered securities.136
The SEC may also seek additional disciplinary action by barring
issuers from the capital markets.137 After the SEC finds that a person has
engaged in fraudulent acts, an issuer may have its securities delisted to
promote equitable trade principles or protect investors.138 After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC may now directly utilize the cease-anddesist proceedings to enforce a suspension or a ban upon demonstrating
“some risk” of future misconduct.139 Moreover, cease-and-desist
proceedings permit the SEC to inflict civil penalties upon a company for
any violation of the Acts.140 However, a business is subject to a maximum
civil penalty of $500,000 for an SEC regulatory violation.141
Although the SEC has broad authority to punish an issuer for its
fraudulent actions, under this scenario, an investor’s personal remedies are
limited and insufficient. The SEC may impose disgorgement damages, but
this is insufficient for investors because the SEC rarely wields this weapon
in Item 303 administrative actions.142 Disgorgement damages are
analogous to a mighty sword, capable of paralyzing the party at which it
aims its swing. However, the sword is useless if you fail to swing it.
134. Id.
135. “In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a) of this section,
the [SEC] may enter an order requiring account and disgorgement, including
reasonable interest. The [SEC] is authorized to adopt rules, regulations, and orders
concerning payments to investors, rates of interest, periods of accrual, and such
other matters as it deems appropriate to implement this subsection.” 15 U.S.C. §
78u–3(e). Disgorgement is a remedial power of the SEC to eliminate all gains
flowing from acts conducted in violation of SEC Regulations. However, the
disgorgement penalty must be casually related to the illicit act, so punitive
damages, which can be granted by the courts, may not be granted in fixing a
disgorgement amount. See SEC v. AMX, Intern., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1541, 1544
(N.D. Tex. 1994). Furthermore, a Westlaw query shows that disgorgement
penalties have only been discussed in 12 Item 303 administrative actions. This
illustrates the remedy’s ineffectiveness.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–3(f).
137. Smith, supra note 131, at 1221.
138. Id. at 1224.
139. Edward Greene & Caroline Odorski, SEC Enforcement in the Financial
Sector: Addressing Post-Crisis Criticism, 16 BUS. L. INT'L 5, 9–10 (2015).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–2.
141. Id.
142. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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Moreover, cease-and-desist actions only require a company to stop
prospectively; these actions do nothing to permit an investor to recoup his
or her losses retroactively. Although delisting a company appears to be
sufficient to deter on its face, it is highly unrealistic to expect this to occur,
absent exceptional circumstances. Alternatively, the courts provide the
best forum for investors to adequately recover their lost investments.
B. Rule 10b-5 Actions Deter Companies from Omitting Material
Forward-Looking Information
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are designed to serve as the primary
private remedies for securities fraud.143 Rule 10b-5 is much broader than
the other rules in Section 10(b), and it may be used as a remedial measure
for parties injured as a result of a defendant’s deceptive conduct.144 It is
used in the context of insider trading,145 manipulative conduct,146 and,
most importantly, false SEC filings.147
The private cause of action is one that has been generally accepted as
implied by Rule 10b-5.148 To bring a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class action
lawsuit against a registered company, a plaintiff must prove the following:
“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter;
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”149
In the context of Item 303, the level of materiality required in a 10b-5
action is often disputed. Rule 10b-5 liability for Item 303 omissions hinges on
whether Item 303 establishes a duty to disclose.150 The SEC reads Item 303
as establishing a disclosure duty “where a trend, demand, commitment, event
or uncertainty is both [(1)] presently known to management and [(2)]
reasonably likely to have material effects on the registrant’s financial

143. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.3(1), at 369.
144. Id. § 12.3(3)(B), at 346.
145. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
146. See, e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 718 F.2d 725 (5th Cir.
1983).
147. See, e.g., Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
148. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.3(1), at 369.
149. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008).
150. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence,
absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”).
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condition or results of operations.”151 The standard of materiality included
in the SEC’s 1989 interpretative release is a lower threshold than the
Court’s standard in Basic.152 That is, less information is required to meet
the requirements of materiality for administrative purposes. When faced
with the disparities between the SEC’s standard and the Court’s standard,
some courts have found that a disclosure duty is absent from Item 303 for
purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.153 This rationale is seemingly focused on
the Court’s higher threshold for materiality.
Two authors have argued that an issuer is subject to a disclosure duty
under certain circumstances.154 Whether a duty to disclose exists will
determine if a party violating a disclosure requirement may face a private
class action lawsuit under Rule 10b-5.155 This discussion hinges on the
belief that a duty to disclose material information surfaces from “(1) the
need to make a periodic filing with the SEC that contains up-to-date
information (such as a periodic report, a registration statement for a
securities offering, or a proxy statement) [and] (2) a regulatory
requirement to disclose certain specific events as they occur.”156
Periodic reporting obligations pursuant to Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of
the Exchange Act require issuers to file periodic reports with the SEC and
to provide up-to-date information.157 These periodic reports, including
annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and current
reports on Form 8-K, incorporate the MD&A requirements of Item 303.158
151. See Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 43 SEC Docket
1330 (May 24, 1989).
152. Id.
153. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014).
154. David M. Stuart & David A. Wilson, Disclosure Obligations Under the
Federal Securities Laws in Government Investigations, 64 BUS. LAW. 973, 977–
78 (2009).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Form 10-K is used as a guide by all reporting companies as they engage in
annual reporting requirements as required by the securities laws and regulations
promulgated by the SEC. See Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm [https://perma.cc/YJC6-FJWH] (last
visited Jan. 1, 2017). Moreover, Form 10-Q is designed to also provide guidance to
reporting companies, but unlike Form 10-K, Form 10-Q guides a company in
quarterly disclosures. Id. Finally, Form 8-K provides reporting guidance to a reporting
company after a significant event has occurred. Id. That is, unlike Form 10-K and
10-Q, which mandate specific timetables, Form 8-K is only used when a
significant event occurs that impacts the company.
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Because Item 303 is a line-item regulatory requirement to disclose certain
material information, a disclosure duty appears to arise for purposes of a
securities fraud private class action lawsuit, as the information is required
by a periodic disclosure and regulatory requirement.159
Although materiality is critical to a lawsuit proceeding through the
courts, there are several other elements of a Rule 10b-5 action that must
be satisfied. Scienter is one of the essential elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim,
and it has narrowed the abundance of Rule 10b-5 securities class action
lawsuits.160 The Supreme Court first held in the 1970s that the intent of the
SEC, when enacting Rule 10b-5, was to govern activities involving
scienter.161 Congress emphasized the Court’s scienter findings in the
enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”)162
and established a heightened pleading standard.163 The PSLRA requires an
injured party to plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”164
Thus, to bring a Rule 10b-5 action for a material omission of Item 303
information, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s action of
omitting the required information was associated with an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.
A Rule 10b-5 claim also requires a plaintiff to prove a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security.165 Additionally, an injured party must show that he or she relied
upon the defendant’s material misrepresentation or omission.166 The
required causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the
defendant’s omission is provided by the element of reliance.167 The Court
has adopted a presumption of reliance through the fraud-on-the-market

159. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2016); see also Stuart & Wilson, supra note
154, at 977–78.
160. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 157 (2008); Scienter, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (3d ed. 2006),
(defining scienter, in the context of securities fraud, as “a mental state consisting
in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud”).
161. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976).
162. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b) (2012).
163. “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)
(emphasis added).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A).
165. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 552 U.S. at 157.
166. Id.
167. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
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theory.168 That is, in the context of federal securities fraud causes of action,
there is a presumption that an investor trading an issuer’s shares did so
based on the integrity of the stock’s value set by the market.169 Requiring
a plaintiff to always establish explicit reliance would be impractical.170
However, the issuer has the ability to rebut the presumption of reliance or
show that it was unreasonable for the investor to rely on the omission.171
Thus, in the context of Item 303 omissions, an investor need not expressly
display reliance on the material omission.
Most importantly, for recovery purposes, the defendant must have
suffered economic loss, otherwise known as damages.172 Correlated to
damages, a plaintiff must prove loss causation.173 Congress has proclaimed
that the burden is on the plaintiff to show the causal relationship between
his or her damages and the company’s fraudulent act or omission.174
However, the concept of damages is meaningless if the courts hold that an
Item 303 omission does not establish an actionable disclosure duty
because an injured party would be incapable of recovery in the courts.
Upon satisfying the six procedural requirements of a Rule 10b-5
action, a class of investors should be able to achieve some form of remedy.
However, both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fail to provide explicit
provisions explaining the process of determining damages.175 Courts have
applied Section 28 of the Exchange Act’s “actual damages” standard176 to
Rule 10b-5 actions.177 The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to prove
168. Id. at 244.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.4(2), at 383.
172. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008).
173. Id.
174. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
175. See id. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(1) states in full:
No person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions
of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in 1 or
more actions, a total amount in excess of the actual damages to that
person on account of the act complained of. Except as otherwise
specifically provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall affect
the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer
performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the
rules and regulations under this chapter.
177. The correct measure of “actual damages” to be used in a 10b-5 action,
under Section 28 formulation, is the fair value of all that the plaintiff received less
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his or her “actual damages.”178 Moreover, a plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action
may be capable of recovering punitive damages.179 Thus, the judicial
remedy for a material omission of forward-looking information is a better
alternative than the SEC cease-and-desist authority because not only is the
plaintiff able to recover his or her “actual damages,” but the court may also
deter similar conduct in the future by this issuer through the imposition of
punitive damages.
IV. THE SPLIT OVER UNVEILING THE CRYSTAL BALL
Congress granted the SEC cease-and-desist authority to protect against
persons committing isolated infractions that present less of a threat to
investors,180 but Congress has noted that injunctive relief by the SEC is not
always appropriate and sometimes the courts will need to get involved.181
Unlike action taken under the SEC’s cease-and-desist powers, which merely
corrects the issuer’s erroneous material omission,182 a private right of action
under Rule 10b-5 inflicts a punishment on the company. However, the courts
have failed to reach a consensus on Item 303’s role in a private cause of action
under the Exchange Act.183 The Ninth Circuit has held that a material
omission of forward-looking information does not impose securities fraud
liability, while the Second Circuit, most recently, held that a material omission
may impose liability when certain requirements are satisfied.184 The Supreme

the fair value of what he could have received absent fraudulent action by the
opposing party. Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 813 F.2d 296, 301 (10th Cir.
1987) (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661–62 (1986)).
178. Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co. Inc., 863 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1989).
179. See Bosley v. Special Devices, 130 F. App'x 143, 146 (9th Cir. 2005)
(permitting a plaintiff to recover punitive damages in a 10b-5 lawsuit).
180. S. Rep. No. 101-337, at 17 (1990).
181. Id. at 14 (“For example, imposition of a civil injunction may result in
collateral consequences that are not necessary or appropriate.”).
182. While the SEC may impose a maximum $500,000 penalty on a
corporation and impose disgorgement damages, these deterrents are insufficient
to truly punish the company, because the SEC may not impose punitive damages
on a company violating Item 303. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-2(b)(3) (2012).
183. Neach, supra note 87, at 781.
184. Compare In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir.
2014) (“Item 303 does not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.”), with Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d
Cir. 2015) (“[A] failure to make a required Item 303 disclosure . . . is indeed an
omission that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim.”).
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Court’s recent denial of certiorari leaves the proper application of Item 303 in
a private securities fraud cause unclear.185
A. The Third Circuit Introduces the Modern Standard for Liability of
Item 303 Omissions
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
addressed liability arising from Item 303 omissions in Oran v. Stafford and
adopted a modernized standard.186 Oran involved a securities fraud class
action lawsuit brought against American Home Products Corporation
(“AHP”).187
At the relevant times, AHP was marketing Pondimin and Redux, weightloss drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).188 In
February of 1994, AHP learned that seven patients who had been taking drugs
containing Pondimin and Redux began displaying symptoms of leaky heart
valves.189 By November 1995, AHP had knowledge of at least 31 cases of
heart valve abnormalities and had received hundreds of adverse reaction
reports regarding symptoms often related to heart and lung problems.190 Only
eight of the heart valve cases were reported to the FDA.191
The Mayo Clinic reported to AHP that it had a total of 17 patients with
heart valve abnormalities in March 1997 and disclosed 24 reports of heart
valve abnormalities to the public on July 8, 1997.192 The Mayo Clinic, the
FDA, and AHP all issued public announcements emphasizing that there
was no conclusive causal evidence between the symptoms and AHP’s
drug.193 These announcements did not have an adverse effect on AHP’s
stock value.194
In mid-September 1997, AHP determined that it would withdraw
Pondimin and Redux from the market after a survey revealed that 92 of
291 consumers had developed heart valve abnormalities.195 Unlike the
public statement, this survey was accompanied by a press release
185. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 135 S.
Ct. 2349 (2015) (No. 14-975).
186. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000).
187. Id. at 279.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 279–80.
193. Id. at 280.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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estimating a significant loss of profits.196 AHP common stock fell over 3%
the following day.197 Shortly thereafter, major publications wrote that
AHP had known of possible heart valve abnormalities since at least March
1997, when the Mayo Clinic first informed AHP of the documented heart
valve abnormalities.198 As a result, the AHP stock suffered an additional 4%
decline in value.199
Plaintiffs alleged that AHP made material misrepresentations and
omissions about the safety of its prescription weight-loss drugs while failing
to disclose numerous studies that linked the drugs to heart valve damage.200
The district court noted that the July 1997 data disclosed by AHP was
immaterial because there had been full disclosure of the May data without
any appreciable effect on AHP’s stock value.201 Moreover, the earlier data
from 1994 to 1996 was immaterial because it would not have had a
material impact on the substance of the July 8 release.202 Finally, the
district court held that a material omission had not occurred when AHP
failed to disclose when it first learned of the adverse health data.203
The Third Circuit initially affirmed the district court’s conclusion that
AHP’s failure to disclose data was not a material omission under Rule 10b5.204 First, the court had to determine the validity of the plaintiffs’
arguments that AHP had an affirmative obligation to disclose the heart
valve data’s effect on AHP’s future prospects under Item 303.205 The court
noted that plaintiffs needed to show that Item 303 provides for an
independent cause of action, or that a failure to disclose would constitute
a violation of SEC Rule 10b-5.206
Applying the Court’s materiality definition in Basic, the Third Circuit
reasoned that a violation of Item 303’s reporting requirements, focusing
on current operations and management’s plans for the future,207 “does not
automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b-5.”208 The
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 279.
201. Id. at 281.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 283.
205. Id. at 287.
206. Id.
207. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 9.4(7)(C), at 30.
208. Oran, 226 F.3d at 288 (stating that Item 303 is an insufficient avenue for
securities fraud liability “[b]ecause plaintiffs have failed to plead any actionable
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court reasoned that Rule 10b-5 and Item 303 contain different standards
for materiality.209 In essence, the court established a rebuttable
presumption that Item 303 material omissions do not constitute securities
fraud. The court’s reasoning has been the subject of a recent interpretive
debate between the Second and Ninth Circuits.210
B. The Ninth Circuit Applied the Oran Court’s Interpretation of Rule
10b-5 as it Relates to Item 303
Courts have announced varying interpretations of the Third Circuit’s
holding in Oran.211 In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s
dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint, holding that Item 303 did not create a
duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.212
NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA”) is a semiconductor company with
its core business involving “the design and sale of two similar semiconductor chips”: one is a graphics-processing unit (“GPU”) and the other
is a media and communications processor (“MCP”).213 GPUs and MCPs
are both designed to function collaboratively with the products of “original
equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), such as Hewlett-Packard (“HP”) and

misrepresentation or omission under that Rule”). A plain reading of this provision
appears to state that Item 303 may provide a basis for liability if the parties
sufficiently plead materiality under the probability–magnitude test. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.303 (2016).
209. Oran, 226 F.3d at 288.
210. Compare In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir.
2014) (“Item 303 does not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.”), with Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d
Cir. 2015) (“[A] failure to make a required Item 303 disclosure . . . is indeed an
omission that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim.”).
211. Compare NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1054–554, with StratteMcClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2015).
212. NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056 (indicating that the plaintiff
did not adequately prove the scienter element of its claim against the defendant).
Both GPUs and MCPs are comprised of “(1) a ‘die,’ or the silicon chip itself, and
(2) a ‘substrate,’ or wafer, which is a green circuit board that ultimately connects
the die to the motherboard’s electrical components.” The semiconductor chips are
manufactured by mounting the die onto the substrate via “bumps” of solder. The
bumps are merged to the substrate using a solder paste. An “underfill” separates
the die and substrate. This is a “glue-like material” that acts as a supplementary
bonding agent to stabilize the die–substrate connection. The solder and underfill,
collectively, are referred to as the “Material Set.” Id. at 1048–49.
213. Id. at 1048.
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Dell Computer (“Dell”).”214 The processors are incorporated into the
motherboards of computers assembled by companies such as HP and Dell,
and the finished product is sold to the consumer.215
Plaintiffs alleged that NVIDIA began receiving complaints in
September 2006 that a number of its semiconductor products were
experiencing cracks in the solder bumps when subject to excessive
pressure.216 NVIDIA attempted to resolve the issue by changing the solder
paste used to a more malleable compound, but new problems began arising
in laptop computers containing NVIDIA’s semiconductors.217 HP and Dell
both observed cracking of the solder bumps attaching the die to the
substrate.218 HP discovered that the cause of the problem was a faulty
thermal profile that caused stress on the solder bumps, and it shared its
findings with NVIDIA.219 NVIDIA took note of these findings and
informed its OEM customers that it would be reverting back to the old
solder.220
In November 2007, NVIDIA filed a Form 8-K stating that “[its] core
businesses are continuing to grow as the GPU becomes increasingly
central to today’s computing experience.”221 In February 2008, NVIDIA
disclosed in its Form 8-K filing that its 2008 fiscal year was a record year
and that the demand for GPUs was driving its growth.222 Finally, in May
2008, NVIDIA disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing that one of its OEMs filed
a claim for reimbursement due to an “alleged die/packaging material set
defect.”223 NVIDIA’s July 2008 Form 8-K filing noted a $150 to $200
million charge to cover costs associated with the die/packaging material
set problems.224 The market reacted to this disclosure, causing NVIDIA’s
stock value to drop 31%.225
A lawsuit arose when purchasers of NVIDIA common stock brought
a class action complaint against the corporation for securities fraud.226 The
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1049.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1050.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1050–51.
226. See Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Fed. Sec. Laws, Miller
v. NVIDIA Corp., No. 08-4260 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
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investors claimed that NVIDIA knew, but failed to disclose, that prominent
“customers . . . were complaining about problems with the company’s main
products.”227 They contended that, pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K,
NVIDIA had a duty to disclose the possibility that the product defects would
have substantial financial ramifications on the company.228 The trial court
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter—a necessary
element for a claim under either Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5—and dismissed
without further leave to amend.229
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”230 The court emphasized
that Item 303 creates a much broader disclosure duty for management than
what Basic requires because Item 303 requires disclosure of information
“reasonably likely to have a material effect.”231 Ultimately, the court’s
interpretation of the Oran holding was that Item 303 does not create a duty
to disclose for purposes of 10b-5.232 As a result, NVIDIA was not liable
for securities fraud under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.233
C. The Second Circuit Declines to Follow the Ninth Circuit’s Incorrect
Interpretation of Oran v. Stafford
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a
decidedly different approach than the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
Oran.234 In early 2015, the Second Circuit in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan
Stanley, affirming the district court’s dismissal, held that the plaintiffs’
allegations that defendants made material misstatements and omissions to
conceal Morgan Stanley’s exposure to and losses from the subprime
mortgage market did not constitute a violation of Section 10(b).235

227. In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 08-4260, 2011 WL 4831192, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. 2011).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 12.
230. NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Basic Inc., 485 U.S.
at 239 n.17).
231. Id. at 1055 (quoting Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Result of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures,
Exchange Act Release No. 26831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 n. 27 (May 24, 1989)).
232. Id. at 1055–56.
233. Id. at 1065.
234. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 106 (2d Cir. 2015).
235. Id. at 108.
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Morgan Stanley sparked the lawsuit in December 2006 when it
executed a two-component proprietary trade.236 The trade involved a $2
billion short position and a $13.5 billion long position.237 The short
position involved the acquisition of credit-default swaps238 and
collateralized debt obligations239 supported by “mezzanine tranches”240 of
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.241 Morgan Stanley,
through the long position, bought the collateralized debt obligations.242
Unfortunately, the housing bubble began bursting in mid-2006,
causing delinquencies and defaults on subprime mortgages, like those
backing Morgan Stanley’s proprietary trade.243 The effects of the bursting
housing bubble caused Morgan Stanley to suffer immense financial losses
on its proprietary trade.244
Plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley, as well as six of its officers and
former officers, made numerous material misstatements and omissions to
conceal the effects of Morgan Stanley’s subprime proprietary trade.245
Expounding upon these allegations, the plaintiffs claimed that the
fraudulent acts of Morgan Stanley inflated its stock price during the class

236. Id.
237. Id. at 97.
238. A credit-default swap is “[a]n agreement to purchase a debt in exchange
for the seller's promise to compensate the buyer if the debtor defaults.” CreditDefault Swap, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
239. A collateralized debt obligation is “[a] structured financial product that
pools together cash flow-generating assets and repackages this asset pool into
discrete tranches that can be sold to investors.” See Collateralized Debt
Obligation, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp
[https://perma.cc/2R7G-2KZH] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
240. A mezzanine tranche is a pool of the cash flows streaming from collateralized
debt obligations that generally carry “AA” to “BB” credit ratings. See CDO
Mortgages, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/cdo-mort
gages.asp [https://perma.cc/JJ68-YQEG] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
241. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 96. A residential mortgage-backed security
is “a type of mortgage-backed debt obligation whose cash flows come from
residential debt” and serves as the foundation for instruments such as collateralized
mortgage obligations. Residential mortgage-backed securities are considered to be
a key factor in the 2008 financial crisis. See Residential Mortgage-Backed Security,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rmbs.asp [https://perma
.cc/C5AM-9KQL] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
242. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 97.
243. Id.
244. Id. In fact, Morgan Stanley lost billions of dollars because of the proprietary
trade. Id. at 97.
245. Id. at 96.
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period and caused the plaintiffs to suffer financial loss when the market
learned the truth about Morgan Stanley’s proprietary trade losses.246
Observing that its judgment was adverse to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in NVIDIA,247 the Second Circuit held that “a failure to make a required
Item 303 disclosure . . . is indeed an omission that can serve as the basis
for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim . . . if it satisfies the materiality
requirements outlined in [Basic].”248 This added to the court’s previous
discussion of Item 303, in which it held that the omission of “known trends
or uncertainties from a registration statement or prospectus is actionable
under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.”249 The court
reasoned that a quarterly filing, which includes Item 303 disclosures, is
similar to registration statements and prospectuses.250
An omission from an Item 303 disclosure would lead a reasonable
investor to infer that “known trends or uncertainties . . . that the registrant
reasonably expects will have a material . . . unfavorable impact on . . .
revenues or income from continuing operations” are nonexistent.251
Furthermore, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted
the Third Circuit’s conclusion in Oran by finding that “Item 303 violations
are never actionable under Rule 10b-5.”252 Conversely, a proper
interpretation of Oran suggests the possibility that a violation of Item 303
could give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5.253 A material omission from
Item 303, thus, may give rise to liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 because Item 303 imposes a duty to speak.254 The Second Circuit
nonetheless proceeded to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ exposure claim because the complaint failed to properly plead
scienter.255 Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court, in March of
2015, left the conflict unresolved when it denied a petition for certiorari
seeking to determine whether the Ninth Circuit or the Second Circuit
correctly interpreted the law.256 However, all lower courts should adopt
246. Id.
247. Id. at 103 (“We note that our conclusion is at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s
recent opinion in [NVIDIA].”).
248. Id. at 100.
249. Id. at 101.
250. Id. at 102.
251. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016)).
252. Id. at 103.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 135 S. Ct.
2349 (2015) (No. 14-975) (declining to resolve “[w]hether Item 303 of Regulation
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the Second Circuit's approach because the philosophy of full disclosure
outweighs the limited remedies available to an injured investor through
the SEC.
V. FAILURE TO UNVEIL THE CRYSTAL BALL SHOULD IMPOSE
SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY
The Exchange Act does not explicitly provide for a private right of
action to enforce Section 10(b) and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder.257 Accordingly, it may appear that the spirit of the Exchange
Act was to provide a publicly administered enforcement regime, as
opposed to a privately administrated enforcement regime. Resorting to this
sort of interpretation would lead to inequitable results and would continue
to enlarge the issues arising under management’s disclosure of forwardlooking information.
Given that the core purpose of the Exchange Act is to implement a
philosophy of full disclosure,258 investors negatively impacted by issuers’
fraudulent material omissions should have an action under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. To do otherwise would run contrary to the spirit of the
Exchange Act. Failure to impose Rule 10b-5 liability for an issuer’s choice
to withhold material forward-looking information promotes a less efficient
market and hurts investors by denying them access to valuable information
when making their investment decisions.259 The investor’s interest in
receiving the information should outweigh a company’s interest in
withholding the information.
Absent a disclosure duty, a company’s omissions are not misleading
as to Rule 10b-5 liability.260 That is, a disclosure duty is not established
solely by the possession of material, non-public information.261 But, there

S-K forms the basis for a duty to disclose otherwise material information for
purposes of an omission actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 as the Second Circuit recently held in direct conflict with
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case”).
257. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008).
258. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (“This Court
‘repeatedly has described the “fundamental purpose” of the Act as implementing
a “philosophy of full disclosure.”’”) (quoting Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977)); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
259. Romajas, supra note 132, at S247.
260. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17.
261. Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996).
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is an affirmative duty to disclose material, forward-looking information
for purposes of nondisclosures under Section 11 of the Securities Act.262
Circuits have found that an omission of known trends or uncertainties from
a registration statement or prospectus is actionable under the Securities
Act. 263 Logically, a material omission of Item 303 should provide a similar
action for periodic disclosures under the Exchange Act. In essence, Item
303 should include a per se duty to disclose.
The Exchange Act, unlike the Securities Act, regulates the disclosure
of information vis-à-vis periodic disclosure forms. The per se duty to
disclose, for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 class action securities fraud lawsuit,
arises because the issuer has a regulated responsibility to provide the SEC
with up-to-date information.264 Although the general rule is that silence,
absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading, this rule is inapposite to Item
303 because the regulatory provisions establish a duty to disclose.
Accordingly, a material omission of Item 303 is misleading because there
is a disclosure duty impounded upon the issuer.
An omission rendered “material” under the Court’s standard of
materiality for speculative information265 should be applied in the context
of a private securities fraud action pursuant to an Item 303 omission. A
cease-and-desist action by the SEC is not as powerful of a deterrent as a
financial punishment for misconduct, so it is necessary to establish
alternative means of deterrence for material Item 303 omissions.266
Although the SEC’s materiality standard for Item 303 does differ from the
Court’s materiality standard,267 the SEC’s standard should only apply for
agency administration actions. For example, the SEC should have broad
authority to impose its cease-and-desist sanctions that prevent a company
from continuing to violate federal securities laws or from engaging in a
potential violation of the law. This does not account for the investors who

262. Id.
263. See Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 120
(2d Cir. 2012); see also Silverstrand Invs. v. AMAG Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 95,
102 (1st Cir. 2013) (“As Plaintiffs correctly point out, an actionable § 11 omission
may arise when a registration statement fails to comply with Item 303 or 503 of
SEC Regulation S–K.”).
264. See Stuart & Wilson, supra note 154, at 977–78.
265. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 238–39.
266. See Greene & Odorski, supra note 139, at 6.
267. Compare Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed.
Reg. 22,427 (May 18, 1989), with Basic, 485 U.S. at 238–39.
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may have suffered financial losses.268 Although the SEC retains the power
to impose disgorgement damages, this is an ineffective tool because it has
only been wielded a handful of times in the context of an Item 303
administrative action.269 Moreover, the SEC lacks the ability to impose the
purest form of deterrent—punitive damages.270 For Rule 10b-5 claims,
such as those in Morgan Stanley, NVIDIA, and Oran, the courts should be
permitted to impose liability for securities fraud in favor of a class of
injured investors.271
Permitting courts to impose liability does not mean that an abundance
of Rule 10b-5 claims for material MD&A omissions are going to arise and
succeed.272 The threshold to bring a Rule 10b-5 action remains high. Not
only must plaintiffs prove a material omission, but they must also prove
scienter; a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; reliance; economic loss; and loss
causation.273 As displayed in the illustrative cases, the claims are often
disposed of for failure to satisfy the scienter requirement.274 The theory
being proposed may in fact increase the quantity of securities fraud
268. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b)(3) (2012)
(“[T]he maximum amount of penalty for each such act or omission shall be
$100,000 for a natural person or $500,000 for any other person.”).
269. See id. § 78u–3(e).
270. See SEC v. AMX, Intern., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1541, 1544 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
271. When Congress enacted the Securities Acts, the “reasonable” investor
was believed to be the retail investor, but times have changed. Now, sophisticated,
institutional investors, as opposed to retail investors, constitute the bulk of
investors. These institutional investors may not need the same protections that
Congress sought to provide as a result of their immense knowledge. However, this
disputed issue is not the focus of this comment. For more information on this
ongoing debate see Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461,
518 (2015).
272. See cf. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993)
(“[T]here is the interest in deterring the use of the litigation process as a device
for extracting undeserved settlements as the price of avoiding the extensive
discovery costs that frequently ensue once a complaint survives dismissal, even
though no recovery would occur if the suit were litigated to completion.”).
273. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008).
274. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015) (holding that the district court properly
dismissed the case by holding that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to
adequately allege scienter); Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100
(2d Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim that
the defendants’ omissions violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the
second amended complaint did not give rise to a strong inference of scienter).
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litigation in federal district courts. While more litigation may arise, and
many of these cases being dismissed for failure to satisfy the scienter
requirement, the overarching policy of disclosure undoubtedly trumps the risk
of vexatious litigation.
Moreover, the issuers are very likely to be protected by the safe harbor
provisions when they elect to disclose material forward-looking information.
The safe harbor rules are designed “to encourage the voluntary disclosure of
forward-looking information by removing the deterrent of liability for making
such disclosures.”275 The instructions to Item 303 provide that “[a]ny forwardlooking information supplied is expressly covered by the safe harbor rule for
projections[,]” including Rule 175.276 Rule 175 shields issuers from securities
fraud liability when the qualifying forward-looking information is grounded
in a reasonable basis and is disclosed in good faith.277 The SEC’s safe
harbor rule for projections also excludes false forward-looking statements
from securities fraud liability, as long as it was issued with a reasonable
basis and in good faith.278 Moreover, a long line of cases has established a
common law safe harbor known as the “bespeaks caution” doctrine.279
This renders material information immaterial as a matter of law when the
forward-looking statements are accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements that do not affect the “total mix” of information provided to the
investor.280 Absent proper disclosure, however, these safeguards are
inapplicable to a party trying to defeat a securities fraud lawsuit.281
Therefore, the standard enumerated in Morgan Stanley should be
adopted when a company fails to comply with Item 303 in a periodic
disclosure. Rule 10b-5 liability must arise when an omission of
speculative, forward-looking information is material under Basic and the
other elements of Rule 10b-5 have been established.282
CONCLUSION
Investors should have the ability to unveil a securities issuer’s “crystal
ball.” That is, investors should have access to all material forward-looking
275. Romajas, supra note 132, at S252.
276. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2016).
277. Id. § 230.175.
278. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 532, 1979
WL 181199 (June 25, 1979).
279. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.–Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d
357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993) (listing cases that apply the bespeaks caution doctrine).
280. Id.
281. Neach, supra note 87, at 744–45.
282. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2015).
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information at management’s disposal. Recently, a federal circuit split arose
on this exact controversy. The circuits dispute whether Item 303 imposes a
disclosure duty upon a federal securities issuer. This determination is critical
to investors seeking to bring a federal securities fraud claim for an omission
of material forward-looking information because absent a duty to disclose,
an omission is not misleading under Rule 10b-5. Issuers should be held
liable for federal securities fraud when their actions fraudulently run
contrary to the clear intent of federal securities laws because Item 303
indeed imposes a disclosure duty upon an issuer. Barring investors from
bringing a lawsuit for such an omission runs contrary to Congress’s intent
to implement full disclosure and the SEC’s intent to permit an investor to
look through the eyes of management.
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